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Ismaël maazaz
A SOUTHERN CONNECTION:  
CHADIAN EXTRAVERSION POLICIES AND THE 
REPERCUSSIONS FOR THE LIBYAN TERRITORY
ABSTRACT
Drawing on field research conducted in Chad, this paper examines Chadian 
extraversion policies and its outgrowths in the remaking of post-2011 Libya. It 
posits that the increasingly outward-looking positioning of Chadian state and 
non-state actors contributes to a redefinition of the Libyan boundary system. 
While the formation of the Chadian state and territory owes a significant debt 
to Libya, the fragmentation of the Libyan political centre has turned it into a 
target for foreign policy initiatives designed by both heavyweight world pow-
ers and its neighbouring countries. The new Chadian extraversion policies 
benefit from the strategic advantages linked to Chad’s location at the cross-
roads of turbulent zones and the sound reputation of its armed forces abroad. 
This extraversion policy may be aligned with the federalist push initiated by 
certain regional Libyan leaders, in spite of outright rejection by international 
mediators. While various armed movements have been striking at the Chadian 
regime from the borderlands for some time, the idea that they might directly 
or indirectly meddle in the Libyan political process has led to worried reac-
tions in both countries. It is therefore worth paying attention to this region, 




Since 2011, the countries that share their borders with Libya have been look-
ing anxiously at the factious contests at play in Cyrenaica, Fezzan and 
Tripolitania. The Skhirat agreements signed in in Morocco in 2015 have failed 
to unite the existing competing leaderships of the Government of National 
Accord (GNA), the General National Congress (GNC) and the Libyan National 
Army (LNA) led by General Khalifa Haftar in the East. Observers and involved 
policy-makers have set off repeated alarm bells with regard to the possibility of 
a partition of Libya, given the diverging pathways of the three historical regions. 
Both veiled and outspoken foreign interventions in Libyan are currently being 
scrutinised in the literature. This interest especially concerns Egypt, given the 
Al Sissi regime’s ambiguous support of General Khalifa Heftar in Eastern Libya. 
The case of Chad attracts less attention, which is probably a result of the more 
infrequent coverage the country triggers. 
Based on field research in Chad, this paper builds on interviews of Chadian 
officials, researchers, and journalists, along with investigations of documents at 
the Centre d’Études et de Formation pour le Développement (CEFOD) in 
N’Djamena, which inform the changing relationships between Libya and 
Chad. The paper explores the consequences of recent Chadian extraversion 
policies for Libyan territorial patterns. Post-Gaddafi Libya is currently experi-
encing open struggles between the forces of General Khalifa Haftar, which are 
based in Tobrouk, and the government of Faiez Sarraj in Tripoli. Although the 
government enjoys international recognition, it remains highly unpopular in 
Cyrenaica; if anything, Haftar has sound support in the region and is reputed to 
be a valuable military commander, although his aura is essentially limited to 
his eastern stronghold. Eager to burnish his international credentials, Haftar has 
looked both eastward (to Egypt) and southward (to Chad) in order to establish a 
sounder transnational network. One of the issues at stake for his LNA is to pre-
serve access to the strategic “oil crescent” of the eastern coastal zone and 
ensure the funding that is indispensable for extending his control over Libya.
According to the original idea of “extraversion” (Bayart 2000), the observed 
dependence of Africans is erected as a mode of action in many cases. Africans 
have never been passive subjects in their international environment; if any-
thing, “external constraints” are commonly used as an “instrument” by “native 
holders of power and by other political actors” (Bayart 2000: 224). In this 
paper, I suggest that it would be pertinent to adopt a modified version of the 
notion in order to properly convey the complexity of Chad’s influence on 
Libya. This concept will be more extensively developed in the next section to 
address the following questions: In what way has Chad developed original 
extraversion policies in recent years? What are the factors and actors that have 
driven such these policies? How are they influencing the territorial reconfigu-
ration of Libya? 
While the partition of Libya has been looming since the events of 2011, 
the literature has to a large extent neglected Chad’s role in the uncertainties 
that characterise Northern Sahara. This paper aims to provide insights into the 
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“Southern connection” of the territorial struggle that is taking place in Libya. It 
looks at the turmoil affecting Libyan territory as having been partly shaped by 
recent military and political developments in Chad, especially the ongoing 
Chadian rebellion in the Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti region (Northern Chad). This 
is not a paper on Libya per se; rather, it is empirically and theoretically 
directed towards ongoing Chadian debates. It analyses how the competing 
powers that are agitating Libya are fuelled by internal affairs in neighboring 
countries, foremost among them Chad. This phenomenon embodies a histori-
cal volte-face, in that Libya has been meddling and interfering in Chadian 
issues for many decades. Finally, the paper argues that Chadian political strug-
gles in the medium and long term may crucially percolate into the showdowns 
for territorial control of Libya and the competing leaderships in the country.
First, the paper looks at Chadian-Libyan relations from an historical per-
spective. Second, the Chadian policies of extraversion are analysed. Third, the 
repercussions for the reshaping of the Libyan territory are considered.
CHADIAN-LIBYAN AGENCY BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE
This section addresses the intricacies of the Chadian-Libyan relationship from 
a historical perspective, and stresses the significance of a series of involve-
ments in the framing of territorial boundaries, national identities, and statecraft. 
Ironically, the absence of any single sound constitutional order in Libya 
has incidentally alleviated the aggressive stance that Libya and Chad have 
historically taken, as demonstrated in seminal works dealing with Chadian-
Libyan relationships (see, for example, Azevedo 1998, Buijtenhuijs 1987, 
Otayek 1984). Chadian officials currently construe their Libyan neighbour as 
an uncontrolled, self-disruptive flashpoint enfeebled by divisions, in sharp 
contrast with the cohesive – and significantly dangerous – regional power it 
had become at the peak of the Gaddafi era. However, the elimination of Libya 
as an effective, outward-looking state actor on the international stage since 
2011 does not signify that it poses no threat in the eyes of Chadian President 
Déby and his entourage. Instead, the transition from a state-based, unitarian 
threat led by Colonel Gaddafi to a “polycephalous”, unstable political con-
stellation has complicated – rather than simply mitigated – tensions in bilateral 
affairs from the Chadian viewpoint. 
Chad and Libya share an intimately intertwined history. The very close 
connection between Southern Libya and Northern Chad has had a range of 
social implications, as illustrated by the property and land conflicts between 
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them 1 (Scheele 2016). Rebellious organisations that have frequently toppled 
the holders of power in N’Djamena since 1960 have taken refuge in neigh-
bouring lands on several occasions, not only in Sudan but also in Libya. The 
laborious formation of the Chadian state, principally through – or in spite of –
volte-faces triggered by political takeovers and civil conflicts owes a significant 
debt to Libya. Chad has also periodically been an attractive site for lucrative 
Libyan investments in sectors such as transport, real estate and finance in peri-
ods of peace (Bennafla 2000). In 1970, Colonel Gaddafi’s newly-established 
regime in Libya began meddling in the ongoing Chadian civil war by provid-
ing financial and material backing to a faction of the FROLINAT who had 
been rebelling against Francois Tombalbaye’s government since 1966, because 
it was deemed to be too close to the French and dominated by Chadian south-
erners. This paved the way for a series of skirmishes between 1978 and 1987 
that regularly pitted Chad against Libya, culminating in the so-called “Toyota 
war” (because of the frequent use of Toyota pickups by fighters from both 
sides), which marked a generation of fighters and contributed to the formation 
of a combative national identity in Chad. In 1973, Colonel Gaddafi invaded 
the Aouzou strip, claiming Libya’s full sovereignty over this 114,000 km2 terri-
tory located between the 18th and 19th Parallels (North) on the basis of a 
treaty signed with Italy in 1935 (Azevedo 1998, Burr & Collins 1999, 
Nolutshungu 1996, Ronen 2008). The removal of President Tombalbaye in 
Chad in a 1975 coup worsened bilateral relations, and Libya entered a full-
scale war with the Forces Armées Nationales Tchadiennes (FANT), while the 
FROLINAT became increasingly divided on the Libyan and French presence, 
leading to a split in 1976. Sovereignty over the neighbouring Aouzou strip has 
repeatedly been disputed. Colonel Gaddafi, on the other hand, frequently 
viewed Chad as a fruitful experimental terrain for application of his constant, 
subtle back-and-forth between pan-Africanist and Pan-Arabist ideologies 
(Neuberger 1982, Ronen 2008). Libya’s position also turned the Chadian 
regime into a tangible prize worth struggling for in order to preserve Western 
influence in Central Africa. From the unified Front National de Libération du 
Tchad (FROLINAT) to the Gouvernement d’Union Nationale de Transition 
(GUNT), the Chadian politico-militaires (rebels) have been forced to position 
themselves with the Libyan role to be played in N’Djamena (Otayek 1984, 
1986). Despite this, Libyan involvement in Chad has remained nuanced since 
the deposition of King Idriss of Libya in 1969, and has faced a number of deci-
sive volte-faces based on the various streams inside Chadian rebel movements 
and successive regimes. Indeed, the Borkou-Ennedi-Tibesti (BET) region 
1. The Sanusiyya, the Libyan clan that settled in Borkou in the early 20th century, 
developed a legal system for private property (Ibid, 2016:122). Many expropriations 
were carried out from the 1980s onwards, which led to confusion and conflict over 
ownership of land (Ibid: 133).
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emerged as a significant geopolitical instrument for the enhancement of 
Gaddafi’s influence in Central and West Africa during the Cold War in the 
fight against the post-colonial order imposed by the French and the United 
States. 
The Libyan national leadership has historically directly or indirectly 
shaped the political and territorial balances of its neighbours. In the face of 
the disintegration of its national cohesion, however, the leadership has been 
turned into a toothless object for competing foreign policies. The three main 
political centres, along with the multifarious militias, have devised their own 
international strategies, building networks of alliances that venture in spectac-
ularly opposing directions. This context is currently favouring the rise of 
extraversion policies and their influence over Libya.
THE NEW CHADIAN EXTRAVERSION POLICIES 
This section analyses Chadian extraversion policies as a series of historical and 
contemporary strategies. Although my outlook is somewhat state-centric and I 
pay more attention to Chadian regimes, I also look at non-state actors based in 
Chad, foremost among them rebel groups. 
The idea of extraversion policies in Africa as construed by the “politique 
par le bas” academic school of the late 1980s focused on the alleged ability of 
African societies to turn the “external environment” into resources and eventu-
ally appear as active participants in global politics and economies (Bayart 
2010, 2000). The concept moved away from the structural explanations upheld 
by dependency theorists at the time, and nuanced state-centric approaches by 
placing the emphasis on bottom-up strategies and social movements. It was 
later extensively debated and reworked (see, for example, Mbembe 2001). 
This paper retains a critical element of the original concept, namely the mobi-
lisation of the external environment to further political agency. For example, 
the regime of Idriss Déby Itno (IDI) profited from its inclusion in global agen-
das to display a robust resilience in the 2000s. Nevertheless, while Bayart and 
his supporters view extraversion as being primarily related to exchanges of 
things and ideas, it is understood here in a more aggressive manner, one that 
includes violence and force. In the case of Chad, both recent military interven-
tions in neighbouring countries and reliance on the part of rebel movements 
on foreign bases account for extraversion strategies.
Throughout the course of the 20th century, various phenomena and trends, 
including the emergence of coopérants networks and the rise of cotton farming 
and exports, have demonstrated Chad’s entanglement in the global economy 
and political order. However, the current regime has expanded the realm of its 
extraversion on a strikingly broader scale. In the 2000s, Chad gradually pro-
jected an image of stability in a turbulent and dangerous area, as illustrated by 
the humanitarian crisis in Darfur (see Marchal 2016), to its Western partners. It 
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is possible to identify at least two dimensions of this extraversion that have 
been profitably rebranded by the regime so that it can maintain its grip on the 
country: the oil production programme and spatial benefit. 
The Chad-Cameroon oil extraction programme was designed in the 1990s 
and effectively began in 2003. Its various aspects have been extensively dis-
cussed in the literature (Behrends 2008, Hoinathy 2013, Magrin 2001, 2013b, 
Magrin & Van Vliet 2012, Reyna 2011). Importantly, it associated a number of 
international contractors and sub-contractors with the Chadian public author-
ities and the World Bank, which granted the Chadian government a major 
loan through its financial arm, the International Financial Corporation. This 
motley crew created an international platform that brought Chadian elites and 
decision-makers together with international contractors and developers. As 
such, the project gave the Chadian authorities considerable prominence on 
the international stage and became a textbook case of a resource extraction 
initiative co-supervised by a range of international contractors. In the first 
years of exploitation (roughly between 2003 and 2008), the oil programme 
came under widespread criticism from civil society activists, academics and 
opposition politicians in Chad and abroad in a civil war context. This phase of 
conflict ended temporarily in 2008 with the opening of a fragile period of 
peace and increases in oil prices. At the time, skyrocketing state oil revenues 
led to a brief and intense “oil euphoria”, cutting off several of the voices that 
were opposing oil extraction and its management. As we will see later, this 
ephemeral euphoria was naturally associated with Chadian military expan-
sion and its involvement in regional conflicts. 
A second version of the Chadian extraversion strategy relates to strategic 
advantages, or accumulated “spatial capital”, in a global context of worsening 
security threats in the Sahara-Sahel region. Indeed, Chad benefited greatly 
from its location at the crossroads of Africa to morph into a focal military 
headquarters for interventions in North, East, Southern and West Africa. It fur-
ther burnished its already sound credentials with the principal security 
providers in the region, namely the French armed forces. It then became an 
indispensable partner, in spite of concerns expressed by French leaders about 
human rights violations and the worrying longevity of the regime. Surprisingly 
enough, Chad framed its recurring experiences of civil wars for its benefit as 
convincing evidence of the value of certain of its elite troops, such as the cur-
rent Direction Générale des Services de Sécurité et des Institutions de l’État 
(DGSSIE), the Presidential Guard. Instead of seeing the conflicts that have 
marred Chad since the 1960s as an ominous sign of a tendency towards polit-
ical instability, the French état-major construed them as toughening moments 
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that helped build a “warfighting spirit” to be reutilised for military deploy-
ments beyond its territorial boundaries 2. 
These two epitomes (the oil programme and the spatial benefit) converge 
as two facets of a single astute, opportunistic external strategy that has paid 
critical dividends internally. The oil-spatial benefit conundrum characterises 
the contemporary Chadian state and the IDI regime, and dyadic extraversion 
strategy such as this cannot be set apart from the military interventionism 
Chad has displayed since 2012. This does not necessarily indicate any obvi-
ous, straightforward causality: it may be difficult to prove that oil production 
in Chad and/or Chad’s geographical setting directly resulted in military oper-
ations in the Sahara-Sahel region 3. More subtly, Magrin (2013a) argues that 
the Chadian intervention in Mali is an illustration of the evolution of the 
Chadian state as combining two critical elements: on the one hand, the vio-
lent, historical making of the Chadian state since pre-colonial times that 
produced a “warfighting ethos”; and on the other, the oil production that 
started in 2003. 
The strategy illustrates the remarkable ability of Idriss Déby Itno (IDI) to 
translate foreign policy successes into political gains on the national scene. 
Chadian interventionism has contributed to the revitalisation of a national 
sentiment. More prosaically, it has also tightened the hold of IDI’s kinsmen 
from the Zaghawa community over all layers of the state apparatus, in spite of 
their limited representation in Chad itself (Marchal 2016). This strategy has 
also downplayed a number of significant bones of contention between IDI 
and his foreign interlocutors. Arguably, IDI’s relations with the international 
community had been absolutely dismal, as informed by recent studies (see, 
for example, Boisbouvier 2015, Marchal 2015). The inauguration of Francois 
Hollande as French President in the Spring of 2012 initially seemed to be 
gloomy news for IDI. Indeed, the new French Head of State had reportedly 
moved towards dismissing the former Françafricain shadow networks, of 
which IDI was one of the iconic figures. Additionally, the Ibni Oumar 
2. As noted by Marielle Debos (Debos 2013), the reputation of the Chadian army 
results partly from the reactivation of colonial clichés that essentialise Chadian peo-
ple as brave “guerriers du desert” 
3. There is a great deal of speculation about the matter, including that oil sub-contractors 
reportedly “paid” for Mali’s military spending. It is difficult to find reliable sources to 
substantiate these claims, however. 
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Mahamat Saleh case weighed considerably on the ruling regime 4. However, a 
wind of change began to blow in early 2013 with outbreaks of fighting in Mali 
and the Central African Republic. These outbreaks added significantly to the 
discrepancy between the rejection by public opinion of the current form of 
Chadian polity and its indispensable nature from a Western policy-making 
viewpoint. Effectively, in spite of its coups d’éclat on the international stage, 
Chad is having to face increasing internal contestations. Political claims have 
recently taken a notably civilian form, embodied by the recent rise of civil 
society and political movements like the Ça suffit coalition or the Mouvement 
pour l’éveil citoyen (MECI).
Claims have also been reasserted by rebel groups. Although admittedly cer-
tain key historical rebellious networks stretching back to the first decade of 
post-colonial Chad, best exemplified by the now-defunct Front de Libération 
National du Tchad (FROLINAT), have been deactivated, new rebellions have 
recently been fuelled by a growing rejection of the Chadian presidency. This 
has created the conditions for momentum on the part of Chadian armed 
groups. One of the latest embodiments of these groups is the Front pour l’Al-
ternance et la Concorde au Tchad (FACT), which was launched by Mahamat 
Mahdi Ali in March 2016. The Tubu people 5 appear once again as an engine of 
the armed movement against the Chadian regime – they had previously been a 
central component of the forces that attempted to overthrow IDI’s regime dur-
ing the brief 2008 Battle of N’Djamena. Interestingly, Mahamat Mahdi Ali is a 
former official of two prominent armed groups that received decisive support 
from the Tubu tribes in the 1990s and fought fiercely against the regime: the 
Mouvement pour la Démocratie et la Justice au Tchad (MDJT) and the Union 
des Forces pour la Démocratie et le Changement (UFDD). Being based in the 
Chadian-Libyan borderland has proved to be a critical military asset for the 
Tubu people and other communities. FACT facilities, assets and troops are 
allegedly located on the Libyan side (Jeune Afrique 2016), which confirms the 
part Libya will be playing in Chadian politics. Mahamat Mahdi Ali has reported 
that tensions have recently risen with General Khalifa Haftar as Haftar has 
sought support from N’Djamena in his fight against the Misrata militias. This 
may prove to be a factor in a potential redefinition of the Libyan border system.
4. Ibni Mahamat Saleh was the Secretary-General of the Parti pour les Libertés et le 
Développement (PLD) and a leading figure in the Chadian opposition. He was 
arrested at his N’Djamena-home on 3 February 2008 and has never been seen since. 
His disappearance has been the focus of several international investigations, which 
have established that it is most likely that he is dead. To date, nobody has been for-
mally incriminated. 
5. The Tubu (or Toubou) people are a group with a presence in Chad, Libya, Niger and 
Sudan that has historically devoted itself to nomadic pastoralism and farming. Several 
Tubus have become prominent Chadian political figures, including Hissen Habré.
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THE REPERCUSSIONS OF THESE POLICIES FOR THE TERRITORIAL RESET 
OF LIBYA
This final section turns to the implications of Chadian extraversion policies for 
the reshaping of Libyan territory. I argue here in particular that the Chadian-
Libyan border is the locus of significant struggles that may contribute to a 
redefinition of Libyan territorial policies. 
A large body of the literature on borders and borderlands in Africa has 
viewed them as barriers, and often sources of conflict, and as such they are 
often conceptualised as constraints, as a burden weighing down state sover-
eignty and authority (Hoehne & Feyissa 2013). A growing number of authors, 
on the other hand, are arguing that borderlands should also be treated as 
resources and opportunities, especially for non-state actors (Korf & 
Raeymaekers 2013). This idea seems to be very relevant for an analysis of the 
armed groups operating at the crossroads of Libya and Chad: the marginality 
of the area and its remoteness from the major political power centres often 
provide protection against state authority and enable them to survive. These 
armed groups, along with the multiple political changes that have shaken 
Libyan since 2011, have been addressed in a number of recent publications 
(see, for example, Cole & McQuinn 2015). Opportunities to conduct field 
research in the BET or in the Fezzan have markedly decreased of late, and few 
scholars have been able to carry out quality fieldwork there. However, a 
handful of academics have recently engaged with the complex trends in the 
flows of individuals, commodities and ideas on both sides of the Sahara, 
breaking down the contrived wall that is conventionally imposed by area 
studies (Brachet 2016, Brachet & Scheele 2015, Scheele 2016, Tubiana 2016). 
This literature takes into account the fact that Libya has never been exempt 
from symbolically charged internal borders. For instance, the Gulf of Sirte his-
torically operates as an effective linguistic delimitation between Northern 
Africa and the region construed as the greater Middle East. Hence, when pur-
suing a national project, the Libyan leadership often saw the Gulf as a strategic 
locus for keeping a lid on the entire territory. The transformation of these sym-
bolic borders into politically charged demarcations is now at stake, however. 
The establishment of new internal borders within Libya would be a demon-
stration of the failure of the General National Congress to engineer a peaceful 
unitary transition in the aftermath of the civil war in 2011. As early as March 
2012, Ahmed al-Senussi was heading the self-proclaimed Cyrenaica 
Transitional Council, benefiting from the disarray within the leadership in 
Tripoli, and later committing to increasing the sovereign powers of the region. 
This early political move paved the way for imposing a federal Libya as a seri-
ous option, in spite of initial reluctance on the part of the United Nations and 
Western policy-makers. Oil reserves were a partial motivation for local lead-
ers in Cyrenaica, while a sentiment of national unity was expressed by 
respected voices in the region. The discrepancy between the solutions being 
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promoted at an international level and certain local solutions are fuelling 
resentment, and appear to represent a critical obstacle to peace.
Two dynamics can be distinguished regarding the territorial reshaping of 
Libya as influenced by Chadian extraversion policies. The first concerns inter-
nal borders. Owing to the dead ends encountered by the other initiatives, the 
federalist option remains steadily on the table in Libya. A federal Libya is not 
exempt from potential benefits for those who may prefer to deal directly with 
Fezzan, Cyrenaica, or other local sources of authority: it would enable them 
to bypass the remote, ethereal authorities of the House of Representatives 
(HOR) and the General National Congress (GNC) and avoid further intrusions 
by international interlocutors, as exemplified by the UN envoy to Libya. For 
now, the path dependency that prevails in international politics with regard to 
uti possidetis juris (the need to preserve existing boundaries) officially pre-
cludes any commitment to the principle of a partitioned Libya, but it does not 
exclude the voicing of bewilderment concerning the possibility of a unitary 
state. As a consequence, federalism has appeared as a sensible middle ground 
that would satisfy many of those who are urging for the end of turf wars. It has 
been framed by local chieftaincies as a necessary evil if a one-state solution is 
to be preserved. Besides, a number of neighbouring entities would not neces-
sarily reject the end of a unitary Libya, and might even view it as judicious 
recognition of an existing de facto situation. These include neighbouring 
states who have constant interactions with local forces on both sides of the 
border. Chadian non-state actors such as the politico-militaires also regularly 
trespass across the physical border in order to carry out activities on the other 
side. As I have mentioned previously, the FACT’s operational headquarters 
and training centres are located on both sides of the border. For this organisa-
tion, whose official aim is to topple IDI’s regime, interacting more directly 
with regional political entities may prove useful for gaining support against 
the Chadian army. Conversely, it is unlikely that a unified government in 
Tripoli would meddle so blatantly in the internal affairs of its Southern neigh-
bours. Therefore, a reshaping of Libyan territorial balances with a slant 
towards federalism may satisfy the FACT, even though their relations with 
local Eastern forces, especially those of Khalifa Haftar, are fiercely hostile.
The second dynamic relates to international boundaries: while internal 
delimitations are being reinforced, portions of the external borders are being 
cautiously sealed off as a result of an outspoken containment policy; indeed, 
Chad finally decided to close its borders with Libya in 2017. This decision has 
mainly been presented as a safety measure to prevent infiltration by potential 
threats, although the nature of these threats has not been disclosed. 
Paradoxically, the closure may also initiate greater involvement by the 
Chadian army in Libyan affairs. In fact, the Chadian Prime Minister subse-
quently declared that the borderlands were a military zone, a measure that 
has severe legal and social implications for the inhabitants of the BET. The 
location of the headquarters of the FACT in Tanoua (Chadian territory) with a 
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training centre in the Djebel Saoudah – in Libyan territory – has explanatory 
force: the Chadian army is now entitled to ignore civilian rule and operate in 
the borderlands, including when it engages with rebel forces. 
CONCLUSION
Various external interventions and interferences have contributed towards the 
framing of Libyan policies since 2011, in particular with regard to the twists 
and turns of its territorial management. Although the weight of the United 
Nations, important powers such as the United States and Russia and high-pro-
file neighbouring players such as Egypt and Algeria have logically been in the 
spotlight since that time, Chadian state and non-state entities should not be 
neglected. The historical intricacy of Chado-Libyan relations has been critical 
in the making of both polities and society. This has left a permanent imprint on 
the political cultures of both countries, and has modulated their territorial 
scope on various occasions, as exemplified by the controversy over the Aouzou 
strip. This paper argues that the current Chadian extraversion policies are a 
factor in the territorial reshaping of Libya. As a contested regime whose sur-
vival is largely negotiated abroad, the Chadian presidency has developed an 
outward-looking strategy to strengthen its legitimacy and relevance in an area 
in which the number of weakened states has risen discernibly. Although West 
and Central Africa have emerged as the main laboratory of this strategy, it is not 
inconceivable that North Africa might also experience jolts from this outward-
ness in the foreseeable future. The official closure of the Chado-Libyan border, 
the declaration of a military zone and the reactivation of a politico-militaire 
organisation in the borderland are three crucial, interrelated events that poten-
tially signal a hazardous redefinition of the regional political order and its 
territorial embeddedness.
The complexity of Libyan foreign policy was a decisive factor for Chadian 
territorial arrangements throughout the 20th century. Now, conversely, the 
attitudes and actions of Chadian rebels, regular armed forces, and poli-
cy-makers in N’Djamena may forge a noteworthy part of the Libyan border 
system. President Déby has denounced the reluctance of Western states to 
contribute to “after sale-service” (services après-vente) in Libya following 
Gaddafi’s removal. This alleged lack of involvement of the powers that are 
deemed to be responsible for the current fault lines that pit one Libyan region 
against another would leave a significant share of peacekeeping responsibili-
ties to the neighbouring countries. These countries, which were far from the 
forefront of the 2011 military interventions, nonetheless face most of the cur-
rent burden produced by the turf war in Libya, especially in the Fezzan. Their 
role is therefore likely to intensify in the very near future, especially if no 
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